Abstract -In traditional auctions, it is often assumed that bidders are a homogenous group.
Introduction
Since the foundation of ebay.com in September 1995, online auctions have being growing tremendously during the past decade. On the one hand, more and more buyers and sellers are In 2004, online auction sales account for 20% of all online sales and that number is expected to be 26% by 2007. Online auctions have not only entered the consumer-to-consumer markets, but also entered business-to-consumer and business-to-business market. On the other hand, a great number of online auction sites come into existence, including such big names as eBay.com, uBid.com, Yahoo, and Amazon.com, to name a few.
Online auctions provide unique opportunities for both sellers and buyers. For sellers, online auctions allow them to access a vast pool of potential buyers via the Internet. The low transaction costs of online auctions also allow sellers to sell those inexpensive goods which would be otherwise sold in garage sales and local flea market but not via auctions. For buyers, online auctions enrich their buying activities. Psychologically motivated buyers now find a place to fulfill their desire by competing with others. Online auctions also help buyers easily locate those hard-to-find and/or outdated items without investigating much effort.
Along with the rapid growth and popularity of online auctions, researchers begin to pay much attention to this phenomenon. It is not surprising that this research stream is still in its infancy given the short period of time. The purpose of this study is twofold. First, this study aims to develop a classification schema based on online bidders' real bidding behaviors. Second, a classification method is employed using that schema to identify the types of online bidders. We focus on an online private auction in which consumers are bidding for an item for their personal usage.
Background and Literature Review

Private Value Model vs. Common Value Model
Information uncertainly is crucial to the auction problem. If information is perfectly distributed, in other words, the seller knows how much potential buyers value his item, he would not bother to design an auction to sell his item. He can just post a price that is equal to or a little below the highest valuation among those buyers. It is just because the seller does not know potential buyers' valuations of his item that he chooses to sell by an auction rather than simply posting a fixed price. When facing information uncertainty, bidders may behave differently. In terms of how bidders form their own valuations of a certain bidding item, economists have proposed two basic auction models, the independent private value model [12] and common value model [14, 15] .
In private value auctions, each bidder knows exactly the value of the item to him but he does not know other bidders' valuations of the item. Bidders' different valuations lie in their different tastes. Any bidder's valuation of the item is statistically independent from other bidders' valuation. Observing other bidders' behaviors will not change a bidder's private valuation. An example of independent private value auction is government construction contract auction in which each bidder knows how much such construction will cost if he wins but he does not know others' production costs. An online private value auction could include most auctions of general consumer goods (e.g., computers, clothing, and home appliance) in which consumers are buying for their personal use.
In a common value auction, the item being bid for has an objective or true value which is the same to all bidders, but nobody knows it. The true value of the item is determined by resale or future exploitation. For example, the true value of an antique depends on the market situation at the time it is sold; the true value of an oil lease auction depends on the actual amount of oil that can be discovered. In order to form their valuations, all bidders have to guess the true value of the item, depending on the information about the item they obtain. An example of common value auctions is oil lease auction and timber cutting auction. Another example is auctions of antiques or stamps in which the bidders are buying for the purpose of resale but not for their own usage or pleasure.
Milgrom and Weber [8] integrate previous research and demonstrate these two models can be nested in a more general model -"affiliated value model." Some auctions indeed involve both private value and common value considerations, depending on the purpose of the bidders. For example, in a sports trading card auction, bidders may purchase for their own pleasure, a private value auction. They may also bid for the purpose of investment and future resale, a common value auction. This is why the independent private value model and the common value model have been interpreted as polar cases [7] . A real world auction may contain both private and common elements.
eBay's Auction Format
eBay's single-item ascending-price auction is actually a combination of traditional English auctions and second-price sealed auctions. Under eBay's bidding rules, every bidder's bid is unknown for others (a key characteristic of sealed auctions), but each bidder enters an auction sequentially and is notified by eBay through email whether he or she is outbid before the end of an auction (a feature that is unavailable for sealed auctions but available for English auctions).
The minimum bid is set to the second highest bid plus a bid increment specified by sellers. Once a bidder enters, eBay will automatically adjust the minimum bid. A bidder with the highest bid wins the auction and pays a price that is equal to the second highest price plus the bid increment.
An example can best illustrate such bidding mechanism. Suppose four bidders , , and
A B C D are bidding for an item. The starting price is $15 and the incremental value is $2. Consider the bidding sequence in Table 1 .
In eBay's auction, the starting price is the minimum bid before any bidder enters. Suppose bidder starts bidding with a bid of $30. The minimum bid is adjusted to $15 + $2 = $17.
Bidder enters the auction with a bid of $25. Since $25 < $30, bidder is outbid by bidder and bidder will know that after eBay sends him a notification. Bidder can then decide whether he reenters this auction or leaves this auction. Meanwhile, the minimum bid is set to the second highest bid plus the bid increment, that is, $25 + $2 = $27. In other words, though bidder 's bid is not high enough to maintain him as the highest bidder, his bid increases the minimum bid since it is the second highest bid. Bidder then enters with a bid of $27. Like bidder , his bid is not the highest bid but increases the minimum bid to $27 + $2 = $29. He also needs to make a decision whether he will continue to bid. Bidder In eBay's single item auctions, a bidder can either bid at the minimum bid or use proxy bidding which allows a bidder to place a bid up to his maximum willingness to pay and the eBay's bidding system will then bid on his behalf. eBay will automatically increase his bid to the amount equal to the second highest bid plus the bid increment until someone's bid reaches his maximum.
Such proxy bidding does not apply to multi-item auctions.
Previous Studies on Online Auctions
A large body of research on online auctions has been conducted in the past several years. A variety of issues have been addressed, including the auction design [10] , bidding behaviors [13] , the effect of a seller's reputation [5] , the price formation [6] , multi-item auctions [3] , and so on.
For example, Roth and Ockenfels [10] examine how the rules for ending an auction (eBay's hard close vs. Amazon's soft close) affect bidders' last minute bidding and find that last moment bidders on eBay are substantially more than on Amazon; Wilcox [13] investigates how bidders' experiences influence their bidding behaviors across four different product categories and finds that more experienced bidders tend to behave in a manner that is more consistent with theory.
One previous study that also attempts to explore types of online bidders is conducted by Bapna, Goes, and Gupta [2] . In their study, three types of online bidders are identified in multi-item B2C auctions, namely, evaluators, participators, and opportunists. However, this study is different from their study in three aspects. First, they focus on multi-item auctions, whereas the present study focuses on single item auctions. It has been suggested that bidders may behave differently in these two kinds of auctions [11] . Second, though they empirically investigate how three groups of online bidders differ in terms of their performance; their identification of those groups is from an analytical perspective. This study aims to establish a classification schema that will then be used to classify online bidders. Therefore, the classification of online bidders in our study is primarily based on a statistical analysis rather than a descriptive analysis. Third, business-to-consumer auctions are of their interests since average consumers rarely sell multiple identical items online, whereas the results of our study is based on consumer-to-consumer auctions. It is expected that consumers' bidding behaviors may vary across different types of sellers (i.e., companies vs. individuals).
Methodology
Data Collection
eBay stores detailed records of completed auctions within a given period of time (usually two weeks of completed auctions but the ongoing auctions can also be tracked), this provides a source of real and high quality auction data. The computer CPU is chosen as the study object for the following reasons. First, computer CPUs are general consumer goods thereby consumers are usually bidding for their personal use. In our data set, we do not find any bidders win two auctions and any prior winners sell their purchases. Therefore, computer CPU auctions can be viewed as a purely private value auction. Second, by choosing a specific brand and speed as well as the same condition (New Intel Pentium 1.8G in retail box is chosen in this study), we can treat these auctions as identical ones, which makes bidders comparable in terms of their bidding behaviors and eliminates the potential confounding effects resulted from the differences in auction objects. Third, Intel Pentium 1.8G CPU is not an inexpensive good. It is expected that consumers' bidding behaviors actually reflect their attitudes toward the online bidding.
Auction data are manually collected from eBay in a one month period from January 23 till February 23 of 2003. The one-month period is chosen based on two reasons. First, in order to minimize the effect of markets on the bidding price, we attempt to make this period as short as possible. Second, we also expect a reasonably large sample size. The one-month period satisfies both requirements.
For each auction, we collect the bidding history as well as each bidder's feedback ratings. A bidder's feedback ratings from other users can be considered as a measure of his or her bidding experience [13] . Data collection finally generates 110 auctions. Among these auctions, 54 auctions ended with a winning bid; 28 auctions ended with "buy it now"; others did not receive any bid or the bid(s) did not meet the reserve price. Therefore, the final sample consists of 54 concluded auctions. These 54 auctions yield totally 439 bids and 310 unique bidders. A summary of the sample is given is Table 2.
Classification Method
We identify five variables that describe how a unique bidder behaves in those 54 auctions. They are as follows:
• Time of entry
• The number of bids a unique bidder submits in an auction
• The number of auctions a unique bidder enters
• The maximum bid a unique bidder submits
• Whether a unique bidder wins an auction
For each variable, several classification variables are also identified. The distribution of subjects by these classification variables are given in Table 3 .
Time of entry
• TOE1 = 1 if a bidder consistently enters an auction in the last minute;
• TOE2 = 1 if a bidder consistently enters an auction in the last hour;
• TOE3 = 1 if a bidder consistently enters an auction in the last day;
• TOE4 = 1 if a bidder consistently enters an auction at other time;
• TOE1 = 0, TOE2 = 0, TOE3 = 0, and TOE4 = 0 If the time of entering an auction for a bidder is on an inconsistent basis.
The number of bids a unique bidder submits in an auction
• NOB1 = 1 if a bidder bids only once in all auctions he or she attends;
• NOB2 = 1 if a bidder bids multiple times in all auctions he or she attends;
• NOB1= 0 and NOB2 = 0 if a bidder bids multiple times in some auctions and single time in other auctions;
The number of auctions a unique bidder enters • NOA =1 if a bidder attends multiple auctions;
• NOA = 0 if otherwise.
The maximum bid a unique bidder submits
• Price = 1 if a bidder's bidding price falls within $96-$162.5;
• Price = 0 if otherwise.
Whether a unique bidder wins an auction
• WIN = 1 if a bidder wins an auction in this given period;
• WIN = 0 if otherwise.
Classification variables related to "the maximum bid a unique bidder submits" should be noted here. We discriminate subjects according to their highest bidding price in those 54 auctions. The price interval $96-$162.5 is used as the classification criterion based on two reasons. First, $96 is the lowest winning bid and $162.5 is the highest winning bid in the period of data collection. It is reasonable to assume that this interval actually represents the true market price fluctuation of the computer CPU under investigation. Second, we expect that bidders submitting a bid lower than the lowest winning bid are different from those submitting a bid within the range of the market price. Table 3 shows the distribution of bidders by classification variables.
Cluster Analysis
SAS 8 statistical software package is used to classify subjects based on those nine classification variables. Since all classification variables are measured in binary terms, subjects are compared using association measures of similarity [4] . One association measure is the Jaccard coefficient [1] which is defined in this study as the number of variables that are coded as 1 for both bidders divided by the number of variables that are coded as 1 for either or both bidders. A distance measure is generated by subtracting the Jaccard coefficient from 1. The centroid hierarchical method is used since this method is less affected by outliers than are other hierarchical methods [4] .
In order to determine the best cluster solution, we employ four criteria. First, the solution should by moving down the column of PST2 statistics, the first value markedly larger than the previous value indicates a possible solution by moving back up the column by one.
Based on these criteria, a four-cluster solution which is more interpretable than other solutions is finally chosen. This solution explains 60.5% of the overall variance; including another cluster only increases the explained variance by 0.3%. The value of the PST2 statistics also indicates a possible four-cluster solution. Though the value of PSF statistics on the four-cluster solution is not the largest among others, it is still relatively large.
In order to validate the cluster results, two other statistical analyses are undertaken. First, the discriminant analysis is performed based on the four-cluster solution and the discriminant functions are found to be statistically significant at .00, and 98.4 percent of cases are correctly classified. Second, we select another variable -bidder's experience which is not used to generate the cluster solution to test the validity of the cluster results. Since bidders' experiences have been shown influencing their bidding behaviors [13] , we expect that bidders' experiences are distinct across four groups. The F ratios in the one-way ANOVA demonstrate that the cluster means for bidders' experiences are statistically significant at .02, conforming that the four groups of bidders are clearly distinct.
The four different groups of bidders are labeled as "goal-driven bidders", "experiential bidders", "playful bidders", and "opportunistic bidders." A summary of each group by classification variables is given in Table 4 . Table 5 shows the characteristics of each group by average experience, average winning bid, and average winning bid plus shipping and handling.
Discussions
The Profile of Each Group
Goal-driven bidders (n = 111). These bidders account for 35.8% of total bidders. They are more experienced than experiential bidders and playful bidders but less experienced than opportunistic bidders. The factors that clearly distinguish goal-driven bidders from other bidders are the time of entry and the probability of winning an auction. 10.8% of these bidders enter an auction at the last minute, 26.1% at the last hour, and 49.5% at the last day. There exists only one bidder from other groups that enters an auction at those times. Goal-driven bidders win 39 out of 54 auctions. 35.1% of these bidders actually win an auction, a substantially higher winning percentage than that of other groups. Since their purpose of bidding is winning, they tend to focus on one auction (75.7%) at a time and submit only one bid (68.5%) at the late stage of an auction. Most of their maximum bids (88.3%) are usually higher enough to win an auction.
Experiential bidders (n = 20). This group is the smallest of the clusters, only accounting for 6.5% of the sample. These bidders are the least experienced bidders. The total number of auctions a unique bidder enters discriminates this group of bidders from other groups. This is not surprising since the main purpose of experiential bidders is to gain some experience by actually bidding, it does not matter whether they are winning or not. They sequentially or simultaneously participate in multiple auctions at the early stage, bid single or multiple times in an auction, and occasionally win an auction.
Playful bidders (n = 59). This group of bidders accounts for 19% of total bidders. These bidders are more experienced than experiential bidders but less experienced than goal-driven bidders and opportunistic bidders. The number of bids as well as the number of auctions differentiates playful bidders from other bidders. These bidders are competitive in nature and think that online bidding is entertaining. They enjoy the process of competing with others in an auction but do not care the results. Therefore, they prefer early entry, only focus on one auction, unanimously bid multiple times in an auction, closely monitor the bidding process, and occasionally win an auction.
Opportunistic bidders (n = 120). This is the largest group of the clusters, accounting for 38.7% of total bidders. These bidders are the most experienced bidders. Factors including the maximum bid, the probability of winning, and the number of bids distinguish opportunistic bidders from other bidders. Opportunistic bidders are deal-prone in nature. They enter an auction early, submit a single bid that is usually lower than the market price, and then leave the auction alone. Opportunistic bidders rarely win an auction.
The Performance of Different Groups
Since all groups of bidders yield some winning bids, this allows us to compare their performance in terms of the winning bids and the final price they paid for the computer CPU. As shown in Table 5 , opportunistic bidders' winning bids on average are the lowest at $124.1; experiential bidders' winning bids on average are the highest at $137.2; goal-driven and playful bidders'
winning bids on average are about the same at $125. This result confirms a general argument that bidders' experiences are negatively linked to their winning bids.
If the S&H is taken into consideration, however, we find that playful bidders and opportunistic bidders almost pay the same price. This finding is a little surprising. One reason that can explain such result is because we use the mean substitution to replace missing values of some S&H.
Among six missing values, there are three in playful bidders and two in opportunistic bidders, whereas the winning bids in each group are only seven and five, respectively.
Conclusions
In this study, we use a classification schema to categorize online bidders in a private value auction. Our empirical analysis demonstrates that online bidders are indeed a heterogeneous group. Four types of bidders are identified, namely, goal-driven bidders, experiential bidders, playful bidders, and opportunistic bidders, which is the most significant contribution of this paper since to date, there has been no published research on the classification of online bidders in C2C single-item auctions.
The performance of each type of bidders is also assessed in terms of their winning bids and the final price. Though opportunistic bidders on average pay the lowest price, their winning chance (4.2%) is substantially slighter than other groups. Among 120 unique opportunistic bidders, there are only five winners. Goal-driven bidders are most likely to be winners. Among 111 goal-driven bidders, there are 39 winners. Experiential bidders on average pay the highest price due to their lack of experience. Playful bidders enjoy bidding online and because of their concentration on a single auction, they also pay a relatively low price.
One limitation of this study is that data are collected in a short period of time in order to minimize the effect of markets on the bidding price. Therefore, we do not consider the situation that some bidders may already enter some auction(s) prior to the data collection and/or continue to enter after the data collection. Further study could extend the period of data collection, keep track of 
